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There was no article in the files on the practice of the Greeks and Romans in these matters which might have made this an ELECTION NUMBER of LCM, nor indeed is there evidence that our masters regard the experience of those peoples as having any relevance to the present day (though those of us who study them might think otherwise). Indeed a Minister is reported in *The Observer* of Sunday 29 May as having, while canvassing in his constituency, "justified cuts in education spending thus: 'We've taken the money away from the people who write about ancient Egyptian scripts and the pre-nuptial habits of the natives of the Upper Volta valley'" (p.16). LCM is not a political journal, and as indifferent to the politics of subscribers and contributors as is the Postal Service, and the Editor makes no comment on the truth of the report or of the facts contained in it. We may perhaps be thankful that the examples were not taken from Greek or Latin. But the attitude it reflects is one that is as old as the century, and one, he fears, that struck a chord in many breasts, if not those of many (or most) of the readers of *The Observer*. What can be done to combat it, he is not clear, but continues to doubt that 'communication' is the way, even if he has done his bit of it himself, as readers of the review will see. He gave the book for review on the understanding that he would print whatever was written, and could wish it had been more severe (perhaps he should print the two pages of notes on the captions that he was sent): but Professor Boardman is no Stubbs, nor the Editor Freeman, and he trusts that both will be absolved from any suspicion of log-rolling, or he should say of ladling butter.

A correspondent wonders whether 'it is worth suggesting that you could cut down the bulk of bibliographical embracketation in the text of LCM' by adopting the Harvard system. Another saw that 'in the latest LCM you are complaining yet again about the labour involved in footnotes' and authorized the Editor 'to transfer my footnote material into brackets with whatever other small alterations you itch to make' (which he would probably have done anyway, but it is nice to be authorized). He is himself quite in favour of the Harvard system, which would also provide a convenient bibliography for those more interested in the subject of an article than in the article itself, but he has come to realize contributors are usually extremely wedded to whatever system of reference they themselves use, and often opposed to the Harvard system for its scientific overtones (but it is not the scientists who are our enemies, even if they are being forced to be our competitors for limited funds), and that they like writing for LCM just because they can do what they like with some hope of seeing it printed in the form in which it is submitted. So he will go no further than to signify his approval of the first correspondent's point and to urge contributors to consider the merits of the suggestion, and to thank the second for his generous permission, which may ensure (as perhaps it was intended to do) that his article appears somewhat sooner than it might otherwise have done.

There is room for some corrections to the article of F.Jones in LCM 8.3 (Mar.1983), 34-37, which got squeezed out by the Editor's eloquence in the last two numbers.

P.34, 2nd para., line beginning '175-6', the reference is to *Epp.* 2.2.55-6.

P.36, first line, the reference to *Sat.* 1.2.124 is of course to that of Horace.

P.36, 2nd para., 2nd line, the reference to Nisbet-Hubbard should read:

at *Odes* 2.12.19 & p.181; for Cnidos see at *Odes* 2.5.20

P.36, 5th para. ('The situation of the older man...'), the reference to *CQ* 30 three lines from the end of the paragraph should be to Murgatroyd and not to Gillies.

Usual apologies to author, readers, and to Messrs Murgatroyd and Gillies, making exactly 75 lines!

- 82 M.HUBERT McDERMOTT (Galway: Modern English): *The Satyricon as a parody of the Odyssey and Greek romance* LCM 8.6 (Jun.1983), 82-85

The *Satyricon* is without doubt the most significant work of prose fiction written in ancient times. The extent of its significance is indicated by the fact that it took western civilization well over fifteen hundred years to produce a work on a par with it. Ironically, the *Satyricon* relative to its importance, the most neglected of works of fiction: the inordinately long intermission of fifteen hundred years between itself and *Don Quixote* may be one reason for this neglect.

A major difficulty confronting any student of the *Satyricon* is that a large portion of the text is missing, having never been rediscovered. There is fairly general agreement, however, that the extant portion of the *Satyricon* covers part of book 14, and all of books 15 and 16, with minor omissions. Ben Perry, *The ancient romances*, Berkeley 1967, 192, estimates that since books 15 and 16 total 96 pages in one text, the original work could have been up to 800 pages long, a staggering thought. There may, of course, have been a book, or books, following the 16th, even.

The title of Petronius' work deserves an explanation, if only because of the numerous misleading ones which have been offered, and, indeed, accepted as accurate. '*Satyricon*', with which one understands the noun *libri* or books', says Perry, 191-2, 'is the Greek genitive plural of σατυρικὸς which is used by Plutarch and by Pliny the Elder, contemporary authors, in the sense of "satyr-like" or "lascivious"'. P.G. Walsh, *The Roman novel*, Cambridge 1970, 72, adds the illuminating information that the word σατυρικὸς also bears the additional sense of 'derisive'. An accurate subtitle for the *Satyricon*, then, would be 'A Derisive Account of Lascivious Behaviour'. Much of the confusion over the title has arisen because of the similarity between the Greek word σατυρικὸς and the Latin one *satirae*, meaning 'satires'. The adjective *satiricus* is not found, in any case, before the 4th century A.D., and there is no connexion whatever, etymologically, or in any other way, between the two words.

It is possible, with evidence based on references within the text to antecedent events, references in the fragments extant, as well as references in contemporary and later authors familiar with the *Satyricon*, to gain some information about the missing section of the work. From fragments 1 and 4 (p.167 in the Penguin translation of John Sullivan, to which reference will normally be made hereafter) it seems likely that the tale opened in Marseilles in the south of France, with Encolpius, the hero, in love for the first time with a girl called Doris. Not unlike many of the heroes of , Encolpius leaves his native home and begins his wanderings because of a dream or oracle which states:

Hero, leave your home for newer worlds:
for you now dawns a mightier day;
be strong, and the Danube, that last boundary,
the icy North and the peaceful Egyptian realms,
the nations of the rising and setting suns,
will all greet you by name: Ithacan, descend,
a greater Ithacan, upon those foreign sands. p.176

From the text we gather that one of his first encounters has been with Lichas and his wife Hedyle, with whom he becomes very friendly. Encolpius seduced Hedyle, and Lichas and he fought as a result (p.114). Another encounter is with Tryphaena, and it seems likely that Giton was her slave, before he was taken away by Encolpius (p.113). The fragments contain a reference to a court case (p.168), which may or may not be connected with Tryphaena's complaint about having her reputation as a decent woman publicly blackened (p.114). Having been prosecuted for some crime or other - possibly associated with Giton and Tryphaena - Encolpius may have given an account of Tryphaena's sexual proclivities, and fled. By the time we meet them, Encolpius and Giton have reached the bay of Naples and have yet another character in tow, Ascyltus. The major episode preceding the extant section of the *Satyricon* involves a priestess of Priapus called Quartilla, whom our characters observe performing rites in honour of that god. A major section of the extant work takes place in a city on the Bay of Naples, moving eventually to the town of Croton.

Any analysis of the *Satyricon* as fiction must begin by acknowledging that the work is a parody of ancient romance, and intended as such by its author. This parody takes two forms, a parody of the *Odyssey* in particular, and a general parody of the body of Greek romance written after the *Odyssey*. The parody of Homer's epic is quite obvious in the *Satyricon* because of the numerous references to Odysseus or his adventures: on each occasion Petronius' intention in parodying the original is fairly clear. The dream or oracle which, we presume, urged Encolpius to leave his home and go on a journey, refers to him as a second Odysseus, promising him similar, if not greater glory than Homer's hero: 'Ithacan, descend, a greater Ithacan, upon those foreign sands' (p.176). Encolpius' subsequent adventures are a travesty of those of Odysseus. Poseidon, the vindictive and implacable revenger of the *Odyssey*, is replaced in the *Satyricon* by Priapus. Although the similarity between the part played by these gods in their respective stories is quite clear, Petronius dispels any doubts we might have when he has Encolpius soliloquize as follows:

Others have been hounded by gods and implacable fate,
not I alone.
Hercules hounded from Argos,
and propping heaven on his shoulders.
Impious Laomedon
and those two angry immortals:
he paid the price of his offences.
Pelias felt the weight of Juno.
Then there was Telephus --
he took up arms in his ignorance.
Even Ulysses went in fear of Neptune's power.
Now I too take my stand among these --

over land and white Nereus' sea I am hounded
by the mighty rage of Priapus of Hellespont. p.160

The choice of Priapus as a Poseidon-equivalent for the *Satyricon* was a masterstroke on the part of Petronius. As well as being a powerful and sinister god, Priapus was also a somewhat absurd deity (cf. H.D. Rankin, *Petronius the artist*, The Hague 1971, 58), so that his comicality dovetailed perfectly with Petronius' design for the story. Like Poseidon, Priapus too was connected with the sea, being the patron of sailors and fishermen: even more pertinent is his patronage of all those who were undertaking a journey (Rankin 58). The *Satyricon* presents this absurd god in a complete inversion of his normal role. His role as patron of sailors is shown, however, when he appears to Lichas in a dream and warns him that his enemy Encolpius is on board his ship. Priapus looms grotesquely over the *Satyricon*, and has a part in every major incident in the work. It is he who delivers the heroes over to Quartilla, delivers them to Lichas, and renders Encolpius impotent with Circe. From the extant section of the *Satyricon* we know that Encolpius has offended Priapus twice: on the first occasion he profaned the shrine of Priapus by spying on Quartilla as she performed the sacred rites of the god; on the second occasion he killed Priapus' darling goose. One can only presume that these are but two of the many blundering offences against the god. The major and continuing offence against Priapus, because of his generative function, is quite probably the homosexual relationship between the hero and Giton. Because of this relationship Encolpius rejects all heterosexual activities, and when the lovely Circe does arouse his passion for the opposite sex once more, Priapus makes him impotent in revenge.

The Circe episode in the *Satyricon* is relevant not only for the implication of Priapus. Petronius intends us to recall the Circe episode in the *Odyssey*, a suggestion borne out not only by the name of the female involved with Encolpius, but also by the pseudonym adopted by the hero - that of Polyænus, an Homeric epithet for Odysseus (O.12.184; I.9.673, 10.544, 11.430). Odysseus succeeded sexually with his Circe; Encolpius fails with his. Odysseus' men are turned into animals; Encolpius too is 'unmanned', but farcically so. It is after his failure with Circe that Encolpius attempts chopping off his genitals, a farcical attempt made even more so by being described in the exalted language normally attendant on major events in epic poetry. This is how he describes the reaction of that part (feminine) to the attempt:

From terror colder than the wintry frost,
it took asylum far within my crotch
a thousand wrinkles deep.
How could I lift its head to punishment?
Cozened by its whoreson mortal fright
I fled for aid to words that deeper bite. p.150

By the time Encolpius has finished addressing the offending part
she held her eyes averted and downcast,
nor altered aught her face at this address
than supple willow or drooping poppyhead. p.150

Encolpius begins to regret having spoken to his member, and 'bandying words with a part of the body that more dignified people do not even think about' (p.151). But he absolves himself from blame when he considers that he has a famous precedent: 'didn't Ulysses have an argument with his heart ...?' (p.151), he says.

Earlier in the work Encolpius has his room raided by a policeman and Ascylltus, who are searching for Giton. When Encolpius sees them coming he orders Giton under the bed, and bids him tie his hands and feet to the webbing to stay out of the clutches of the searchers. 'Giton was not slow, and in a moment he inserted his hands in the fastenings and beat Ulysses with his own tricks' (p.105) - a reference to Odysseus hiding himself under the shaggy belly of the Cyclops' ram to escape detection. Giton escapes detection at first, in spite of the policeman's pushing a rod under the bed to see if anyone was hiding there. As in all the best farces, however, sneezes, which shake the bed, reveal the whereabouts of Giton. When Ascylltus pulls back the mattress, 'he saw our Ulysses, and even a hungry Cyclops would have had pity on him' (p.107).

Later, when Encolpius and Giton find themselves on the ship, at sea, of their greatest enemy Lichas, they compare themselves with Odysseus and his men trapped in the Cyclops' cave (p.110). Perhaps the most farcical incident of all in the *Satyricon* which is compared with a scene in the *Odyssey* is the recognition scene on board Lichas' ship. Encolpius has taken great pains to hide his identity - not by clothing himself in beggar's weeds like Ulysses, but by shaving his head completely, eyebrows and all, and having the inscriptions of a runaway slave put on his face. Giton's true identity is discovered by his voice, and Lichas immediately suspects that the other may be Encolpius. Encolpius describes how Lichas

... ran to me, and without considering my hands or face, but immediately stretching out an investigating hand to my private parts, he said: 'How are you, Encolpius?'.
Will anyone now be surprised that Ulysses' nurse after twenty years found a scar sufficient identification when this shrewd man so cleverly went straight to the one thing that identified the runaway? (p.114)

What is so distinctive about Encolpius' private parts, or why Lichas should be so familiar with them is a matter for speculation only. The missing part of the *Satyricon* would obviously hold the answer.

The parody of the general body of Greek romance in the *Satyricon* is, as one might imagine, much less precise than the parody of the *Odyssey*. There is no reference by name, in the extant section at any rate, to any Greek romance, and there is only one reference to the romance in general, when Quartilla accuses Encolpius, Ascylltus and Giton of behaving like the 'brigands of romance' (so Jack Lindsay, London 1960, p.60; Michael Heseltine, London 1961, p.23, translates 'robbers of romance', Sullivan, p.37, 'unimaginably criminal'). But the total inversion of the typical romance plot and general situation in the *Satyricon* is far too obvious to ignore.

Allowing for exceptions at individual points in individual stories, the Greek romance follows a well defined pattern. A young couple fall in love, and are prevented from consummating their love. This 'prevention' usually takes the form of physical separation, as they travel about the world facing one danger after another, until they are reunited, return home, are married and live happily ever after. Fortune is usually credited with causing the trials and tribulations of the lovers. There are numerous incidents which recur with boring regularity in the romances - shipwrecks, capture by pirates, narrow escapes from death, rape and seduction, trial scenes, reunions and sensational recognitions. There is an obsessive preoccupation with the concept of chastity in all the romances.

The normal heterosexual relationship between the hero and the heroine of a Greek romance is travestied by the homosexual relationship between Giton and Encolpius, for instance. This pair of 'lovers' mock the lovers of Greek romance at almost every point in their 'love affair'. They have problems of infidelity and even rape: every male Giton encounters covets him as a sexual partner of his own, and this is true of even the aged Eumolpus. Ascyllus is a case in point. He begins by trying to rape Giton, and when the boy objects he tells him: 'If you're playing Lucretia you've met your Tarquin' (p.33). Ascyllus eventually manages to seduce Giton, and when Encolpius finds the two in bed together, a brawl develops. The combatants eventually agree to allow Giton to choose his lover. Encolpius gladly agrees because he is convinced, as all 'true lovers' are, that his loved one will be true to him: contrary to his expectations, however, Giton opts for the 'rapist'. Having later recovered his loved one Encolpius finds the problem of Giton's chastity still gnawing at him. 'Tell me, dear', he says to him, 'that night Ascyllus stole you away from me, did he stay awake and do anything bad to you, or was he content with a lonely and honourable night?' (p.151). Giton reassures Encolpius that his chastity has been preserved. Far from being preoccupied with chastity - except for that of the other partner in the relationship - the lovers are always on the lookout for fresh sexual exploits. In effect, complete and utter debauchery is a hallmark of the whole of the *Satyricon*, and the suggestion seems to be that there is no such thing as virtue: even the interpolated story of the Matron of Ephesus bears this out.

The *Satyricon* has most of the incidentals of Greek romance also - shipwreck (p.123), apparent death (p.103), attempted suicide (p.100). It also has the stock reunion scene; when Giton and Encolpius meet after being separated, this is how Encolpius describes the scene:

I rushed to take him in my arms and press my cheek to his tearful face. For a long time neither of us recovered voice. The boy's lovely breast heaved with a succession of sighs. 'Oh, this shouldn't happen', I said, 'for me to love you though I was deserted, and for there to be no scar on my heart after this great wound. What have you to say after giving yourself to another lover?' (p.100)

When Giton goes off with Ascyllus, Petronius takes the opportunity of having Encolpius pour forth his heart like the typical hero of Greek romance. This soliloquy, while reminding one of the typical soliloquy of the Greek romance, is yet an inversion of all the sentiments normally expressed in such soliloquies:

'Why couldn't that earthquake have swallowed me up? Or the sea, such a menace even to innocent people? Did I escape the law, did I outwit the arena, did I kill my host, only to end up, despite my claims to be a darling criminal, just lying here, a beggar and an exile, abandoned in a lodging house in a Greek town? And who brought this loneliness upon me? An adolescent wallowing in every possible filth, who even on his own admission had been rightly run out of town, who had known freedom and respectability only in contexts of vice, and who had been hired as a girl even by someone who knew he was a man. As for the other one! Putting on women's clothes the day he became a man, talked into effeminacy by his mother, doing only women's work in the slave pen, and after he couldn't meet his debts and had to change his sexual ground, he abandoned the claims of an old friendship and - in the name of decency! - sold out everything like a whore on the strength of a one-night stand. Now the loving pair lie clutching each other every night, and perhaps when they are worn out by their love-play they laugh at my loneliness. But they won't get away with it. As sure as I'm a man and not a slave, I'll wipe out the insult with their guilty blood.' (p.91)

All this is forgotten, however, when Giton returns, and quite soon the pair find themselves floating together in stormy seas, their ship having been wrecked; they utter the typical complaints of lovers about to die:

Clasping Giton to me with a cry, I wept and said: 'Did we deserve this of heaven - is death alone to unite us? But our cruel luck does not allow it. Look, the waves are already overturning the ship. Look, the angry sea is trying to break our affectionate embraces. If you [Giton] ever really loved Encolpius, kiss him while you can, and take this last pleasure from the jaws of death'.

As I said this, Giton took off his clothes and, covered in my tunic, brought up his head for a kiss. And in case the envious waves should drag us apart even when clinging together like this, he tied his belt round both of us and said: 'If nothing else, we will float longer if we are tied together in death, or if out of pity the sea is likely to throw us up on the same shore, either some passing stranger will throw stones over us out of common humanity, or, as a last favour that even the angry waves cannot refuse, the drifting sand will cover us'. (p.124)

In spite of the fact that Priapus dominates the action of the *Satyricon*, and is acknowledged by Encolpius as doing so, Fortune too, in keeping with the tradition of Greek romance, is given its share of the action. Fortune is mentioned on at least six occasions, and in terms very much akin to those in which Priapus is referred to. It is Fortune, for instance, that Encolpius blames (p.108) for putting them on the same boat as Lichas and Tryphaena, and he acknowledges later that Fortune has defeated him (p.109). When Lichas' ship is wrecked, and Giton and Encolpius are in

the water together, Encolpius views the storm as simply obeying the commands of Fortune (p.124). The most interesting references to Fortune come while Encolpius and company are in Croton. Everything is going so well for Encolpius that he presumes that Fortune - not Priapus - had 'taken her eyes off me' (p.142). Later, when legacy-hunters have been drained dry and are beginning to cut down on their liberality, Encolpius presumes that Fortune 'is beginning to have her regrets again' (p.162). This distribution of the action between Priapus and Fortune seems a further indication of Petronius' double purpose in the *Satyricon* - to parody both the *Odyssey* and Greek romance. 85

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H.MacL.CURRIE(Teesside Polytechnic): *Plautus, Poenulus* 1174-1279, and a possible Semitic parallel. LCM 8.6(Jun.1983), 85-86

This scene, near the conclusion of the play, presents an interesting display of contrasting moods and emotions. The Carthaginian Hanno, after searching throughout the known world for his two daughters kidnapped from him in childhood, has at last arrived in Calydon and is about to realize his long cherished hope. He utters a devout prayer to Jupiter, the arbiter of human life (1187ff.), to which his flippant young nephew Agorastocles adds the comment, *omnia faciet Iuppiter faxo, nam mihi est obnoxius et me metuit* (1191). Hanno, in tears, begs him to be silent. Even the extrovert Agorastocles observes that the old man is deeply moved, but he does not really grasp the pathos of the situation, and cheerily exclaims (of Adelphasium, one of the sisters, with whom he is deeply in love), *patruus mi patruissime ... est lepida et laeta. ut sapit!* (1197f.). To this Hanno replies, *ingenium patris habet quod sapit*, but though he is at the end of his wearying quest and after many seasons is on the threshold of the desired reunion his mood nevertheless suddenly, by an odd twist, changes, and he starts to play a little game with his daughters before revealing his identity to them. He pretends to summon the girls to court to face a charge, but the accusation is not stated immediately; lines 1199-1236 are taken up with various exchanges between uncle and nephew (and with contributions from the girls). Eventually Hanno comes out with it:

fures estis ambae. 1237

....

quia annos multos feilias meas celauistis clam me

atque equidem ingenuas leiberas summoque genere gnatas

1239-40

Gregor Maurach, in his useful edition of the play (Heidelberg 1975), writes thus of the scene: *Der Inhalt der Szene ist ein gleichsam geforderter; irgenwann musste die Wiedererkennung stattfinden. Hier findet sie nun auch wirklich statt, doch die Faktizität wird vom Dichter interessant gemacht, indem er seine Fopperei einflücht. Wieder scheint das eigentlich Reizvolle weniger in der Situation als vielmehr in einem unerwarteten Ablauf des Erwarteten zu liegen, und hierin hat man die 'Originalität' des Dichters zu suchen.*

This *Fopperei*, consisting in a false accusation of theft and forming an important part of a recognition scene which is marked by strong emotion, is, I suggest, not unlike the biblical story of Joseph's revealing of himself to his brothers (*Genesis* chs.43, 44 & 45.1-15). The text of the whole account of Joseph (son of Jacob and Rachel, and favourite of his father, who was sold into Egypt by his brethren and there became the Pharaoh's *Traumdeuter*, rising to high position in the land) occupies chapters 37-50, and is, with its doublets and occasional obscurities, not untypical of the book as a whole - see Gerhard von Rad's magisterial commentary, *Das erste Buch Mose, Genesis*, Göttingen 1956.

Stith Thompson, *Motif Index of Folk Literature*, Copenhagen 1957, at H 151 4 'Recognition by cup in sack; alleged stolen goods', cites Spanish, Italian and Indian parallels for the Joseph tale. The book *Genesis* contains many obvious folk-tale elements, some of them archetypal - see my article 'Virgil, *Eclouge* 6, 13ff., and the Numa-Egeria legend', LCM 3.10(Dec.1978), 289-291, in which I drew attention to the fact that the 'capture and demand' motif present in the Menelaus-Proteus and Midas-Silenus stories and in Virgil's version of each (*G.* 4.315ff. & *E.* 6.13ff.) is also found in the ancient Hebrew tale recounting how Jacob wrestles with the mysterious stranger, prevails over him, and demands and receives what he wants, a blessing (*Genesis* 33.24ff.).

The story of Joseph's meeting and reconciliation with his brothers is rather diffusely handled, being woven from several strands. But its outline is clear. He greets Benjamin, the youngest brother, and is so overcome with emotion that he withdraws to another room where he breaks down and weeps (*Genesis* 43.30-31). Yet when recovered he does not hasten to reveal his identity. Instead, he arranges the *Fopperei* of the cup in Benjamin's sack, which leads to the accusation of theft (the whole of ch.44), and hence to the climax of the narrative in chapter 45.1-15, where Joseph can bear the tension no longer and utters the famous words (v.3), 'I am Joseph: doth my father yet live?'

In the *Poenulus* the pattern is much the same: Hanno weeps at the sight of his long lost daughters (1192); recovers; unaccountably commences a mystifying hoax by instituting a mock legal action against them (1225 & 1232) and accuses them of theft (1237ff.) - the theft from him of his daughters; reveals himself as their father after puzzling them with a piece of *Fopperei* (1251ff.). The whole scene is shot through with the light-hearted interventions of Agorastocles. This effect of strongly contrasted moods occurs elsewhere in Plautus. The first forty lines of the *Pseudolus*, in which we have the heavy sadness of the lover Calidorus along with the steady stream of jests from the sprightly Pseudolus, exhibit the same kind of counterpoint. Similarly, in the *Rudens* the pathos of the two girls' distress stands out clearly against the coarse comments of Trachalio (664-705).

But it is the unexpected alteration of mood leading to a hoax involving a false charge of theft, which we find both in the Hebrew context under discussion here and in the classical, that is my main concern here. The *Poenulus* may at least in part derive from the *Καρχιδώνιος* of Alexis (see W.G.Arnott, *HhMus* 102[1959], 252-262). Did Plautus' Greek source or sources contain this particular

- 36 motif, or did he independently pick it up from tradition, or did he just happen to think of it himself? We cannot be sure. But there is no harm in speculating. The Phoenicians were a seafaring Semitic people engaging in trade. Spice and Tyrian purple are not the only things that travelled throughout the Mediterranean world. A recent papyrological discovery (*P.Oxy.* 2944) indicates that a story like 'The judgment of Solomon' was known in Greece in the 4th century B.C., though there is no sign that it came from the Bible.

Postscript. Joseph is the Hebrew Bellerophon. For the 'Potiphar's wife' or 'Virtuous Joseph' motif, see Stith Thompson K 2111 'A woman makes vain overtures to a man and then accuses him of attempting to force her'. As well as from Greece, parallels are reported from Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, India, Persia and China.

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C.G. THOMAS (U of Washington, Seattle): *Philip II, Alexander III, and Hellenistic kingship.*

LCM 8.6 (Jun. 1983), 86-87

Classical scholars in the United Kingdom and Canada (perhaps Australia and New Zealand as well) are fortunate in having ready access to the volumes in the Fontana History of the Ancient World. The individual studies are of high quality and, increasingly rare in recently-published books, they are affordable since they are available in paperback form. Not all would-be users are so favored, however; inaccessibility in the United States - and presumably elsewhere - makes it almost impossible to employ the books where they are particularly needed - the classroom. Barriers in the field of education are often unnecessarily firm.

This opening volley may be quite in the spirit of the introductory commentary of each number of *LCM* (regularly the choicest section) [the Editor bows modestly!], yet it need not continue beyond the comment that I regularly use *Democracy and Classical Greece* by J.K. Davies (having purchased a copy at the University of British Columbia), *Early Greece* by Oswyn Murray (which I own having reviewed it for *AHR*) and, when available, *The Hellenistic World* by F.W. Walbank. It is this newest addition to the Greek side of the series that prompts my more specific comments.

The Hellenistic World is a judiciously balanced study: Walbank treats the whole of the period from its antecedents in the 4th century to its incorporation in the Roman empire in the 2nd and 1st centuries. His geographical view is equally wide: Greece is not forgotten as activity moves away from the Aegean, yet the rest of the eastern Mediterranean is fully examined. So too is there a balance of topics: intellectual developments are considered along side institutional features of the period. One theme woven throughout the book can serve as an indicator of Walbank's wide perspective, that is the changing nature of rule as political horizons expanded. And it is a subject that might be even more sharply focused for its significance in understanding the Hellenistic Age as a time of political as well as cultural synthesis: a variety of institutions were gradually drawn together and recombined to produce the forms identified as distinctive to the 3rd through the 1st centuries B.C..

The impetus for these developments came from Macedon, of course, and the recent spate of studies on Macedonian history has improved our perception of the nature of that kingdom and its kingship. Rule began as personal leadership and the personal strength of the king remained essential for the Antigonids in the 3rd century quite as much as it had been for the Argeads. The Macedonian state was a primitive military state in which the king was *primus inter pares*, and the need for strong personal leadership was so essential that it was possible to bypass a natural heir in monarchical succession. At the same time, the growth of a consolidated territorial state brought new conditions and other requirements for leadership. Although a territorial state existed as early as the late 6th century, it was not until the second half of the 4th century that it reached its greatest, most concrete dimensions. Thus, during this period the implications of territorial constraints were felt on the institution of kingship. Specifically, it was during the reign of Philip II that there developed, as J.R. Ellis has convincingly argued (*Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London 1976, 8) 'an allegiance to the single nation, through the army, and to the king-commander as the single head'. Walbank reaches the same conclusion in his text: 'Hitherto a backward frontier kingdom on the fringe of Greece proper, Philip had transformed Macedonia into a powerful military state with a tried army and well-chosen frontier, dominating Greece through the League of Corinth ...' (29).

With these alterations, the nature of Alexander's political inheritance was two-fold: he came to a position in which king and state were equated in a form of rule that joined personal and national characteristics. However, he did not preserve this inheritance in recognizable form: his own kingship became an increasingly personal rule as he moved quickly, though perhaps not completely consciously, away from the national features of Argead rule. Leadership through personal charisma, reliance on his *hetairoi*, use of divine honors to himself, the plethora of official titles and positions that he himself held - all were traits of a personal, not a national ruler. Again Walbank: 'In distancing himself from Macedonia and its national traditions Alexander had moreover necessarily assumed an autocratic power' (37).

There is yet another stage in the development of Hellenistic monarchy: the rule of the Diadochi, which Walbank also defines as personal rule 'not in any sense national (except in Macedonia)' (74f.). It is at this point that I part company with Walbank: rather than emphasizing the personal elements in the rule of the Successors and their adherence to a pattern set by Alexander, it is wiser to stress the dual legacies of the Diadochi (as Walbank himself mentions on several occasions). What is more, such an emphasis serves to underscore one of the causes for the confusion in the fifty years following Alexander's death. While Alexander's kingship incorporated certain

features of earlier Argead rule, he created an idiosyncratic form of monarchy. Some of his innovations persisted into the 3rd and 2nd centuries, yet changes wrought by Alexander had to be re-worked before a suitable tool of government was fashioned by his Successors. That reorganization required the efforts of a long-lived generation of powerful individuals.

In addition to the normal difficulties of establishing a new administrative structure for the segments of Alexander's empire, the Successors had to escape the direct shadow of the personality of their predecessor. The power of the man was undoubtedly overwhelming; the description of a 'Titan' is common to all the surviving sources, and the memory of such a man could not be erased. At the same time, his short career had set a pattern that was not suited to long-term control of an empire. Certain of the innovations of his personal kingship did not encompass enough of the administrative needs of the successor kingdoms. Thus the Successors could not assume Alexander's position unaltered, but the weight of his personality and accomplishments prevented immediate, complete alteration of that inheritance.

For sixteen years his Successors remained officials of an administrative unity, at least temporarily. Only in 306 did Antigonus the One-eyed accept the title of king; he was followed in this step by his son Demetrius and by Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus. Walbank argues that the newly-acclaimed kings 'were exploiting the death of Alexander IV to claim kingship within their own particular territories - though not kingship of those territories ... The exception was Macedonia and [when] Cassander calls himself 'king of the Macedonians', his purpose in doing so is perhaps to assert a unique position not open to any of his rivals ...' (56f.).

Cassander's purpose is soundly reasoned, and it is interesting to note the appeal of the Macedonian throne to various of the Successors: not only Cassander but Lysimachus, Seleucus, Demetrius, even Pyrrhus were, at least for brief periods, kings of the Macedonians. But what was the nature of their kingship in their own realms? Is it correct to conclude, with Walbank, that 'The later career of Demetrius, who was for several years a king without a kingdom, is some indication that these monarchies were felt to be personal, and not closely linked with the lands where the king ruled'? To be sure, Demetrius and his father are good examples of personal rulers; they attempted to continue the pattern established by Alexander. In struggling to control the whole empire, they were not confined to a well-bounded territorial state, and their rule could be extended or restricted according to the fortunes of war. However, Antigonus and Demetrius were not successful in preserving the unified empire, and their failure may have helped hasten the decline of personal monarchy itself.

Conditions were different for Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and, as Walbank acknowledges, Cassander, all of whom inherited established administrative structures along with the fixed territory of their satrapies. Unlike the domain of Antigonus, the satrapies were territorial divisions. Moreover, the administrative machinery was a resource that had not been available to Alexander. Although the Successors continued to rely on their Friends for aid as had Alexander, these Friends held specific offices that had been part of a governmental structure for centuries. The structure was more than a resource - it was a necessity: to govern Egypt or Asia without a wide range of official positions would have been impossible. With Macedonians and Greeks in key positions, the long-established systems of governance continued to function much as they had in the past under non-Macedonian rulers. And the ability to draw on skilled personnel meant that the demands on the Hellenistic monarchs themselves were less heavy than they had been on Alexander: an impersonal machine increasingly replaced personal leadership.

Walbank hints at the proper interpretation of the role of the first Hellenistic rulers in his description of Ptolemy, who 'was already king of Egypt to the native population but he never calls himself king of Egypt in any Greek document' (56). The Successors had at least a dual inheritance - the national monarchy of Macedon and the personal leadership of Alexander - and several of them had a third legacy in the customs and institutions of their spear-won domains. It was necessary for the immediate Successors to sort through the individual pieces of their legacies and accommodate their rule to all those particular elements. Alexander could not be forgotten, for it was the force of his personal rule that had created the empire they were now dividing. Still Alexander could not be used as a model for leadership in the new form of state. The difficulty of the task of combining national and personal rule is concretely reflected in the length of time needed to carry it through.

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S.H.BRAUND(Exeter): *Cicero on Hiempsal II and Juba: de leg.agr.2.58-9* LCM 8.6(Jun.1983), 87-89

The Rullan bill contained a special exemption for *ager publicus* held by Hiempsal II, king of Numidia (on the bill as a whole, E.S.Gruen, *The last generation of the Roman Republic* [1974], esp. 389-396; on Hiempsal, see the new evidence published and discussed by V.N.Kontorini, *AntClass* 44 [1975], 89-99). Speaking against the bill in 63 B.C., Cicero remarked upon the exemption:

atque etiam est alia superiore capite, quo omnia veneunt, quaestiosa exceptio, quae teget eos agros, de quibus foedere cautum est. audivit hanc rem non a me, sed ab aliis agitari saepe in senatu, non numquam ex hoc loco, possidere agros in ora maritima regem Hiempsalem, quos P.Africanus populo Romano adiudicavit; et tamen postea per C.Cottiam consulem cautum esse foedere. hoc quia vos foedus non iusseritis, veretur Hiempsal, ut satis firmum sit et ratum. cuiusmodi est illud, tollitur vestrum iudicium, foedus totum accipitur, comprobatur. quod minuit aucionem decemviralem, laudo, quod regi amico cavet, non reprehendo, quod non gratis fit indignor. volitat anim ante oculos istorum Iuba, regis filius, adulescens non minus bene nummatus quam bene capillatus.
de leg.agr.2.58-59; cf. 1.10-11

Cicero alleges that the exemption was the direct result of bribery. Of course, accusations of bribery against opponents are commonplace, not least where kings are concerned; an extreme instance is provided by C. Gracchus, who, when speaking against a proposed *lex Aufeia* - of which the purport remains uncertain -, proclaimed that those who opposed the proposition (himself naturally excluded) were motivated by the prospect of money from Nicomedes III, king of Bithynia, while those who supported it were motivated by the prospect of money from Mithridates V, king of Pontus: those who did neither, he claimed, were the worst of all, for they had money from both kings (Gellius, *NA* 11.10; cf. D. Magie, *Roman rule in Asia Minor* [1950], 1043 n.27). As has been recognized, accusations of this sort were easy enough, for the bestowal of gifts was integral to friendly relationships between Romans and royalty: one man's gift was another man's bribe (see esp. W. Allen Jr., *CPH* 33 [1938], 90-92; E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* 274-70 B.C. [1958], 154-167; W. V. Harris, *War and imperialism in Republican Rome* 327-70 B.C. [1979], 90). Therefore Cicero's allegation must be treated with some suspicion.

Further, it is likely that the lands held by Hiempsal and exempted under the Rullan bill had been considered worthy of special treatment before, exempted under the *lex agraria* of 111 B.C.: our inability definitely to locate these lands prevents certainty on the point (see E. Fentress, *Numidia and the Roman army* [1979], 54, and the literature she cites). Moreover, Hiempsal had some claim to exemption on the grounds that, as Cicero himself tells us, C. Aurelius Cotta had confirmed his holdings when consul in 75 B.C.: this fact in itself - unless we suppose bribery or similar malpractice - tends to suggest that Hiempsal had a case. But, unfortunately for the king, his agreement with Cotta had not been formally ratified: under the terms of the Rullan bill a ratified *foedus* would have ensured immediate exemption, as Cicero makes plain. That the agreement had not been ratified could mean that it (and Cotta) had opponents: such opposition would in turn suggest that, as early as 75 B.C., there were those who wished to reclaim the *ager publicus* held by Hiempsal. The existence of such opposition seems confirmed by Cicero's assertion that Hiempsal and this land had been the subject of considerable debate at Rome, both inside and outside the Senate: Cicero may well be exaggerating the level of this debate, for to do so suits his case, but it can hardly be complete invention (on the view that Hiempsal was exempted as a sop to Pompey, see R. Seager, *Pompey: a political biography* [1979], 63 n.53, who is justly critical).

This little affair of 75 B.C. has been relatively neglected by historians: it may profitably be set in the history of the period. We should compare Rome's actions on another part of North Africa, Cyrenaica. It was in the same year, 75 B.C., that the decision was taken to annex Cyrenaica, bequeathed to Rome in 96 B.C. (see Harris 267, after G. Perl, *Klio* 52 [1970], 321-325). As consul in 75 B.C., C. Aurelius Cotta is likely to have been involved in this too: Maurenbrecher argues that he was the prime mover (Sallust, *Hist.* 2 fr.43, with Maurenbrecher ad loc., a view defended by Perl 321 n.1). The decision to annex Cyrenaica at long last seems to have been taken under pressure: it seems generally agreed that annexation was inspired by shortage of grain and money at Rome, aggravated by pirates operating from Cyrenaica amongst other places (on the whole affair see Harris 154-5 & 276, and the literature he cites: note also S. Applebaum, *Jews and Greeks in ancient Cyrene* [1979], 62-68; G. Rickman, *The corn supply of ancient Rome* [1980], 50). As might be expected, Cotta, as consul, was very much concerned with these difficulties. He, his fellow consul L. Octavius, and Q. Metellus, a candidate for the praetorship, were set upon by a mob while walking in the *via sacra*, and were forced to take refuge in Octavius' house, fortuitously nearby (Sallust, *Hist.* 2 fr.45). According to Sallust, Cotta delivered a speech *in contione* in which he defended himself against the popular hostility of which this attack seems to have been symptomatic - hostility generated by the difficulties of the times, most pressingly shortage of grain (Sallust, *Hist.* 2 fr.47; on this speech see G. Perl, *Philologus* 109 [1965], 75-82, & 111 [1967], 137-141).

It is surely possible, if not provable, that the economic difficulties that brought about the annexation of Cyrenaica also drew attention to the *ager publicus* held by Hiempsal, and generated considerable debate on the subject. It is also worth observing that Cicero states that this land was situated *in ora maritima*: therefore piracy may also have been a factor in Hiempsal's case. We can now understand why Cotta was dealing with Hiempsal on the issue of the *ager publicus* he held in 75 B.C.: Cotta's agreement with Hiempsal evidently involved the king's retention of this land: this is perhaps a little odd if Cotta did indeed play so large a part in the annexation of Cyrenaica, but our information is such that we cannot hope to penetrate the political intrigue that doubtless surrounded these issues (very possibly complicated further by the contemporary questions surrounding the Egyptian and Bithynian bequests). Cotta himself has been characterized as 'a master of intrigue' (R. Syme, *Sallust* [1964], 200, with Perl artt.citt.). Whatever the case, we are now in a position to appreciate why it was that Cotta's agreement with Hiempsal met with the opposition that it seems to have done: though the agreement is nowhere explicitly mentioned in this connexion, we may suppose that it did nothing to improve his popularity.

II. Cicero closes this section on Numidia by introducing Hiempsal's son Juba, who was later to figure so prominently in the Pompeian cause as Juba I: he was apparently in Rome, acting for his father. Cicero's epigrammatic characterization of him as an *adulescens non minus bene nummatus quam bene capillatus* points the allegations of bribery made earlier in the passage and at *de leg. agr.* 1.10-11. But what are we to make of *bene capillatus*? This reference to Juba's hairiness has been taken to be a sexual innuendo: Cicero implies, it is held, that Juba dispensed sexual favours as well as money, a sort of *puer capillatus*. E. J. Jonkers, *Social and economic commentary on Cicero's de lege agraria orationes tres* [1963], 28, allusively observes that 'Cicero's insinuations are positively coarse'. It may be that Freese, in the Loeb edition, had some such interpretation in mind when he translated '... a youth whose full purse attracts not less than his flowing locks'. The *puer capillatus* is a figure more familiar in the 1st century A.D. perhaps, but sexual innuendo is made all the more likely in this case by the fact that there was a marked tendency at Rome to

rumour and humour about real or supposed sexual relationships between Romans and royalty, as for example in the case of Caesar and Nicomedes IV of Bithynia (Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 2 & 49; see further J.Griffin, *JRS* 67[1977], 21 n.31, and note also Plutarch, *Cato minor* 73; cf. D.Timpe, *Hermes* 95[1967], 470-495, but compare F.Millar, *JRS* 69[1969], 235).

At the same time, long hair might be seen as the mark of the non-Roman (*OLD* s.v. *capillatus*; note the sexual context of Catullus 37.17): Juba conformed to the stereotype admirably, for he had not only a mop of hair but also a full beard, as coin-portraits amply testify (see, most conveniently, J.M.C.Toynbee, *Roman historical portraits* [1978], 91; cf. Strabo 17 p.878C.). We should note that when Caesar quarrelled with Juba - quite possibly on the same visit to Rome - he grabbed the king by his beard: again, Juba's hairiness is an outstanding feature (Suetonius, *DJ* 71). It is probably no more than coincidence that the younger Africanus, mentioned by Cicero at *de leg. agr.* 2.58, is credited with the introduction of daily shaving at Rome, though Cicero is very likely to have known as much (Pliny, *NH* 7.211; cf. E.Rawson, *JRS* 62[1972], 33-45).

This is not the first time in *de leg. agr.* 2 that Cicero stresses the hairiness of his opponents, if Juba may be counted as such. Earlier, he describes Rullus himself, once elected tribune, practising a new expression, tone and gait, clothed in rags, *capillatior quam ante barbaque maior, ut oculis et ad aspectu denuntiari omnibus vim tribuniciam et minitari rei publicae videretur* (2.13; cf. Charisius, *Ar. grammatica* [ed. C.Barwick, 1925] 1.95: for anment of tribunes and other *populares* in this speech and elsewhere, see R.Seager, *CQ* ns22[1972], 328-338, esp. 332-338). It is particularly striking that *de leg. agr.* 2.13 and 59 are the only two passages in the whole of Cicero's considerable extant works in which the word *capillatus* occurs in any of its forms.

The humour of Cicero's picture of Rullus is evident: it is in similarly humorous terms that we should understand his subsequent reference to the hairiness of Juba, humour possibly tinged with sexual innuendo. Cicero was always fond of a pun: thus, for example, when he introduces his audience to Chrysogonus he quips *venio nunc ad illud nomen aureum Chrysogonum* (*pro Rosc.Am.* 124; cf. V.J.Matthews, *G&R* 20[1973], 20-24). It is with another pun that he introduces his audience to Juba and rounds off his section on Numidia. The pun is simple enough: in Latin, *iuba* means, most familiarly, 'mane', but can be applied to a wide range of things which may be considered hairy (*OLD* s.v.). It may readily be used, therefore, of human hair, especially long hair: in English, of course, 'mane' may be similarly used of human hair.

Thus Seneca uses *iuba* contemptuously of the long hair of men (*brev.vit.* 12.3): *quomodo excaudentur si quid ex iuba sua decisum est, si quid extra ordinem iacuit, nisi omnia in anulos suos reciderunt!* The usage is not confined to Seneca (cf. Statius, *Silv.* 5.1.83-4; Martial 1.31.6), but it is quite possible that one who drew upon Cicero for so much was encouraged to use *iuba* in this context through an appreciation of Cicero's pun: it may well have been included in the collection of Cicero's jokes, in three books, which, Quintilian complains (6.3.5), was so complete as to include material damaging to Cicero's reputation (on Cicero and Seneca, see M.T.Griffin, *Seneca, a philosopher in politics* [1976], passim, and cf. now C.Moreschini, *RCCM* 19[1977], 527-534). We should observe how Cicero helps the pun with *volitat*: the verb is appropriate both to Juba the man and *iuba* the mane. Used later of the Rullan commissioners (*volitareis, de leg. agr.* 2.99), the word invariably occurs in Cicero's speeches with (usually strong) pejorative overtones, as in *Sex. Rosc.* 135; *Cat.* 2.5 & 15; *Flacc.* 38; *Dom.* 49, with Nisbet ad loc.; *Sest.* 1 & 94; *Pis.* 8; *Mil.* 91; *Phil.* 9.6. Some may consider *Flacc.* 38 an exception.

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H.D.JOCELYN(Manchester): 'Diatribes' and the Greek book-title Διατριβαί *LCM* 8.6(Jun.1983), 89-91

Since my article 'Diatribes and sermons' appeared in *LCM* 7.1(Jan.1982), 3-7, various friends given to writing about the history of Greek philosophy or of Latin literature have told me very firmly that there did exist the things they are accustomed to call 'diatribes'. Dr H.B.Gottschalk, *LCM* 7.6(Jun.1982), 91-92, declares bogus the works attributed to Archytas and Aristippus under the title Διατριβαί, and finds common to all the other works bearing this title an interest in ethics and a number of 'tricks of style'. I should not want to deny that the ethics lecturers described in the works which Gottschalk deems genuine used a 'simple and homely language', addressed their audiences directly, turned from time to time to quite imaginary addressees, and related anecdotes. These 'tricks' do not, however, amount to very much. They certainly do not form a unity requiring a special name like 'diatribe-style'. I am not averse to hearing the moralizers of post-classical Greek and classical Latin literature put together with Big Brother. Such comparisons occasionally keep undergraduates awake. They ought not, however, to be dressed in language laying claim on insufficient grounds to an ancient philological lineage.

The book-title Διατριβαί occurs in six lists of works by philosophers transmitted in the *Φιλοσοφικῶν βιβλίων καὶ δογματικῶν συναγωγῇ* of Diogenes Laertius. At least one of these lists, that of Aristippus' works at 2.85, goes back as far as the early 2nd century B.C., to Sotion's Διαδοχαὶ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν. The first translator of Diogenes' Greek, St Ambrose of Camaldoli, turned Διατριβαί here and elsewhere as *Diatribae* having in mind, no doubt, the usage of Aulus Gellius (1.26.1; 17.20.4; 18.13.7). Subsequent translators into the European vernaculars, however, have concealed their bewilderment behind rhetorical variety. R.D.Hicks, for example, talks of Aristippus' 'Essays', Persaeus' 'Interludes', Ariston's 'Dissertations', and the 'Lectures' of Cleanthes and Sphaerus. Gottschalk attempts to deal systematically with the evidence of the lists as a whole. His arguments are intelligent and worthy of an answer.

Gottschalk observes that in the lists Διατριβαί 'is co-ordinate with, but distinguished from, such items as dialogues, σχολαί etc.', and concludes that 'it must therefore denote some kind of

90 literary product in this context'. Σχολαί is as mysterious an entity as Διατριβαί, but we may agree that we know what a dialogue was. A dialogue was indeed a 'literary product'. It does not however follow that a list item Διατριβαί functioned exactly like Διάλογοι. I note in the six lists a number of grammatically similar items which relate to the theme of a particular work rather than to its form: at 2.84 'Ενύπνιον; at 2.85 Ναυαγοί, Φυγάδες; at 7.36 Πολιτεία Λακωνική; at 7.175 'Ερωτική τέχνη; and at 7.178 Τέχνης διαλεκτικής δύο (with which contrast 7.202 Περί της διαλεκτικής πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα δ' [Chrysippus], and cf. 7.36). Just as one must interpret Τέχνης διαλεκτικής δύο as 'two books about the τέχνη διαλεκτική' so one may interpret Διατριβών in the same list as 'a book about διατριβαί'. Or one could supplement Διατριβών <...> on the model of 2.85 Διατριβών ἔξ, 7.163 Διατριβών ζ', 7.175 Διατριβών δύο. In any case Περί Ἡρακλείτου πέντε must be read as a separate item.

Gottschalk deduces from two items in the 7.163 list - Περί σοφίας διατριβών ζ' and 'Ερωτικά διατριβαί - that 'διατριβή denotes the form'. So it would seem at first glance, but I should point out that in the first case we may have two distinct items, Περί σοφίας and Διατριβών ζ', and that in the second the adjective may come not from the author of the work but from some librarian trying to distinguish two boxes of rolls, each labelled Διατριβών, and not worrying too much about the sense of διατριβή. There immediately follow two items open to the same kind of explanation, Ὑπομνήματα ὑπὲρ κενοδοξίας and Ὑπομνημάτων κε'. In case anyone should want to argue that my hypothetical librarian must have understood διατριβή as to do with form I draw attention to the list of Democritus' works at 9.46-49, and to such items in it as Αἰτίαι οὐράνιαι and Αἰτίαι περὶ πυρός καὶ τῶν ἐν πυρί; here αἰτία clearly has to do with theme (cf. also 5.87 Αἰτίαι περὶ νόσων α' [Heraclides]). The titlature of ancient books is too complex to permit the sort of deductions that Gottschalk wants to make.

Gottschalk rightly points out that the doubts reported by Diogenes concerning the works ascribed to Aristippus and Ariston of Chios (2.84, 7.163) concerned whether they were correctly so ascribed. I continue however to think that some such works originally had no ascription at all, that they were anonymous records of what went on in philosophical gatherings. Persaeus, Sphaerus and Ariston may be put down by modern scholars as 'minor Stoics', but some in Antiquity thought well enough of them to preserve their books and perhaps even to ascribe to them the books of others. There is no reason to deny them pupils given to taking copious notes. The philosophical scene in late 3rd century B.C. Athens looked very different to those who participated in it from what it did to later generations obsessed by the great names of the school founders.

It is not in dispute that at 7.34 (Ζήνων ... τὰ παραληψία ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς ... γράφει) Diogenes regarded the work mentioned 'as a book written by Zeno and containing Zeno's own views'. But, *pace* Gottschalk, Diogenes cites nothing from it, and even if he had done so one could not draw firm conclusions about its form. He regularly cites statements from Plato's Dialogues as if they were made by Plato himself *in propria persona*. The famous τοῦ δὲ θεράποντος ἐν δὲ βασιλάζοντος ἀργύριον καὶ βαρυνομένου, ὡς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς, 'ἀπόχεε', ἔφη, 'τὸ πλεόν καὶ ὅσον δύνασαι βάσταζε' (2.77) will not yield a work Διατριβαί written by Bion and containing Bion's views simply through the adducing of 1.30 (οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐδοξον after Εὐδοξος in 1.29) and 9.62 (οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον with Ἀντίγονος ... ὁ Καρύστιος following in the same section). In neither of these cases is a citation made of a particular work.

Nor is such a citation made in any of the other passages where Diogenes employs the locution οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα (to my list in *LCM* 7.1 [Jan. 1982], 6, add 7.64 & 144, 9.46 & 88, 10.24). There are at least two passages, 7.144 (εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινὲς πῦρ, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ ἑβδόμῃ Περί μετεώρων· καὶ μείζονα τῆς γῆς, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ἑκτῇ τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγου· ἀλλὰ καὶ σφαίροειδῆ, ὡς οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον φασιν, ἀναλόγως τῇ κόσμῳ) and 10.8 (ἐκάλει ... τοὺς τε περὶ Πλάτωνα Διονυσιοκόλακας) where the locution clearly indicates a plurality. The text-book doctrine of 'periphrasis' simply smothers the problem of what Diogenes and other fairly careful writers of Greek intended to convey by οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα. I am not at all confident even in my second attempt at translating οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ('Bion and his associates'). It occurs to me that here and elsewhere Diogenes may have been trying to indicate that he drew his information not directly from ὁ δεῖνα but from some secondary source claiming a connexion.

Gottschalk asks himself whether the title Διατριβαί did not originate in late 3rd century B.C. Alexandria 'as a label attached by librarians to certain works which did not fit neatly into any other category'. The answer must be no. The list of Aristippus' works attributed to Sotion (2.85) is not divided into formal or thematic categories, as, for example, are those of Heraclides (5.86-89), Chrysippus (7.189-202) and Democritus (9.45-49). Neither indeed is any of the other five lists. Διατριβών ἔξ, which comes seventh in a list of twelve items, has to be treated as a title relating either to a specific theme or a specific form. In any case there were plenty of straightforward Greek words available to denote the unclassifiable. Callimachus wrote *πύνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμπάντων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν* and called what he could not classify *συνγράμματα παντοδαπά* (frgs. 434-5 Pfeiffer). The singular noun διατριβή had in ordinary Greek a range of quite clear and specific uses. It is impossible to see how it could have served to ticket the unclear and the un-specific.

Gottschalk emphasizes the grammatical difference between ὁ δεῖνα ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς and Ἀρριανὸς ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς Ἐπικτήτου, translating the latter as 'Arrian in his report of Epictetus' discussions with his pupils' and interpreting the former as 'so-and-so in his "diatribes"'. This is a tenable view, but once taken it precludes the holder from using Arrian's work in order to picture what the likes of Zeno, Cleanthes, Persaeus, Sphaerus and Ariston wrote.

In order to shore up the conventional view of the 'diatribe' as a genre of writing created in 3rd century Stoic circles to carry ethical teaching, Gottschalk reaffirms the doubts held by Sosicrates of Rhodes about the Διατριβών ἔξ attributed to Aristippus and himself questions the authenticity of the Διατριβαί attributed to the Pythagorean Archytas. If however the Διατριβαί of Aristippus was a forgery it has already been concocted by the early 2nd century B.C.. Believers in

the Stoic 'diatribe' have still to explain how such a work could be attributed to Aristippus. Forgers usually sought plausibility for their concoctions. Similarly, if the *Διατριβαί* of Archytas was a forgery it came from much the same period. The forger must have thought that the title *Διατριβαί* could plausibly cover a work concerned with arithmetic and geometry. Believers in essentially ethical 'diatribes' have to explain why. 91

If we possessed entire the work referred to by Diogenes at 2.77 we should know a great deal more than we do about the 3rd century Athenian schools and the way in which the scholars talked. We might not, however, be much the wiser about the exact significance of the work's title. In the meantime let us talk about Greek philosophy and Latin literature in plain English, maintaining silence about what we do not know, and forget about the 'diatribe'.

POSTSCRIPTUM Dr Gottschalk kindly showed me the text of his rejoinder to my rejoinder [which is printed immediately following. Ed.]. I shall make two observations and try to keep silent for evermore about αὐτὰ *Διατριβαί*.

1. It is true that, unlike *διατριβαί*, αὐτὰ does not appear without a complement in any of Diogenes' lists. It does, however, appear elsewhere as a literary title (e.g. as that of Callimachus' famous collection of aetiological elegies). No one has (yet) declared the existence of a genre 'aetia'.

2. *Περὶ σοφίας διατριβῶν ζ'* is no more the 'received text' than *Περὶ σοφίας, Διατριβῶν ζ'*. Recent editions, perhaps under the influence of the 'diatribe' theory, prefer the former. Older texts vary. The late Byzantine manuscripts on which we depend could tell us nothing about how the list at 7.163 was originally articulated. The only item in this list or in the others which might be judged to offer support for Gottschalk's case is *Ἑρωϊκὰ διατριβαί*. I still submit that it can be explained away.

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H.B.GOTTSCHALK(Leeds): *More on DIATRIBAI*

LCM 8.6(Jun.1983), 91-92

The argument about the meaning of *διατριβαί* boils down to two questions: the use of the word in Diogenes Laertius' book lists, and what we can infer from the few *diatribai* or fragments of *diatribai* which have come down to us.

1. What distinguishes *διατριβαί* from most of the other terms discussed by Professor Jocelyn is that it can stand in book-lists with or without a complement denoting the subject-matter; the only parallels are such words as *ὑπομνήματα* and *διάλογοι* (7.178), which certainly denote the form. αὐτὰ does not occur by itself, although *περὶ αἰτιῶν* does (5.59). If the received text at 7.163, *περὶ σοφίας διατριβῶν*, is correct, this is conclusive; Jocelyn proposes to alter it, but has adduced no reason other than the needs of his argument.

Jocelyn suggests that *διατριβαί* denoted lectures not written down by the man who gave them, but by pupils or associates, or lectures of which the authorship was in some way doubtful (he is not very clear on this point, but it may be worth remarking that we hear of many spurious or doubtfully authenticated works which were not called *diatribai*). His paradigm are the *διατριβαί* attributed to Epictetus which, as is well known, were written up and published by Arrian. But from the unusual form of their subscription in the manuscripts, where both men are named, and which has no counterpart in Diogenes' lists, it would appear that this was not a typical or necessary feature of *διατριβαί*; indeed, Diogenes also quotes 'Posidonian *scholai*' containing Posidonius' ideas but compiled by one of his followers, the part of each being carefully distinguished (7.41 *Παναίτιος δὲ καὶ Ποσειδωνίου ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχόνται, καθά φησι Φανίας ὁ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου γνῶριμος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Ποσειδωνείων σχολῶν*). On the other hand, Jocelyn accepts that Diogenes quoted Zeno's *διατριβαί* as if they had been written by him and contained his own teaching, like any other of his works.

For Diogenes, therefore, his readers and presumably his authorities, the word *διατριβαί* carried no suggestion of spuriousness or that the works to which it was applied were written by anyone except their purported author. Diogenes' quoting statements from Plato's dialogues as Plato's supports my case rather than Jocelyn's, as does Diogenes 2.77: if οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς *διατριβαῖς* φασὶν refers to *διατριβαί* written by οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα, whoever that may be, this is no reason for denying that ὁ δεῖνα ἐν ταῖς *διατριβαῖς* refers to *διατριβαί* written by ὁ δεῖνα. But I still think that my original interpretation is simpler and more probable.

2. This is enough to establish my first point, that *διατριβαί* denotes a literary genre. What kind of genre is a more difficult question. We have to ask first how precisely the word was used. It ought to have had a very specific meaning, as Jocelyn says. But Jocelyn himself admits that the librarians who used it may 'not have been worrying too much about the sense' of the word, and if this is correct, it may have been used loosely in all the surviving relevant texts. In that case all we can say is that it must have denoted a body of literature sufficiently homogenous and substantial to deserve a separate name (rather than being lumped with *συγγράμματα παντοδαμά*) and sufficiently different from the other recognized categories to be kept distinct. If we want to know more, all we can do is to look at the few specimens of *διατριβαί* which have come down to us, entire or in fragments. The only complete examples, those attributed to Epictetus, are untypical in one respect, as we have seen. But there would have been no reason for calling them *διατριβαί* unless they had something important in common with the *διατριβαί* attributed to Zeno and others, and this can only have been their literary form. Scanty as they are, the fragments in Sextus and others (see §7 of my last paper, LCM 7.6[Jun.1982], 92) would support such a conclusion, as far as they go. The combination is not as strong as one would like, but it is supported by what little evidence there is and not contradicted by any. We really cannot demand more.

All the extant remains of *διατριβαί*, with one possible exception, are concerned with ethics,

- 92 but if my argument is correct, this is not a necessary characteristic of the *genre*; it may have arisen simply because this form was felt to be particularly appropriate to this subject-matter. The possible exception is the fragment attributed to Archytas (FV 47 B 4). If this came from a discourse on pure mathematics, that would be grist to my mill; but for the Pythagoreans there was always a close link between mathematics and ethics, as many passages, including Archytas FV 47 B 3, explain. My doubt about its authenticity has nothing to do with its title, but arises from my inability to see any significant difference between this snippet and the masses of pseudo-Archytas quoted by Stobaeus elsewhere in his collection (see Thesleff, *Pythagorean texts of the Hellenistic period*, pp.8ff.).

Finally we have to ask whether the tricks of style associated with 'diatribe' form a unity deserving a special name. I agree with Jocelyn that too much has sometimes been made of them. But Orwell thought them enough to characterize a style of public speaking and, indirectly, the personality of Big Brother - this is why I referred to him. In Greek and Roman literature we find the same bag of tricks used over and over again by the most diverse writers, some of them able enough to have thought of other devices, if they had chosen to do so. It is useful to have a name for such a thing, and there are enough historical connexions to justify our using 'Diatribe'. This need not imply that the word had exactly the same meaning for the ancients as for us; the same is true of many of our literary terms.

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DAVID WEST(Newcastle-upon-Tyne): pauca meo Gallo

LCM 8.6(Jun.1983), 92-93

The Gallus fragment is more interesting than it seems to be. We can accept Nisbet's translation of lines 2-5 in the admirable *editio princeps* (R.D.Anderson, P.J.Parsons & R.G.M.Nisbet, 'Elegiacs by Gallus from Qasr Ibrim', *JRS* 69[1979], 125-155), but put forward a different interpretation

<i>fata mihi, Caesar, tum erunt mea dulcia, quom tu</i>	2
<i>maxima Romanae pars eris historiae</i>	3
<i>postque tuum reditum multorum templa deorum</i>	4
<i>fixa legam spoliis divittiora tuis.</i>	5

'My fate will then be sweet to me, Caesar, when you are the most important part of Roman history, and when I read of many gods' temples the richer after your return for being hung with trophies.'

Nisbet refers this to 45 B.C., when Caesar was preparing a huge force to attack Parthia. He was assassinated three days before he was due to depart. On this view Gallus is contrasting Caesar's destiny to become part of Roman history by conquering Parthia with his own, to wait at home and read in historians that Caesar's spoils have been dedicated in the temples: 'he will not even be present at the triumph, but will read about it afterwards in the history-books' (*JRS* 69[1979], 142).

But this contrast between the maker of history and the reader of it is not sufficiently pointed to emerge clearly from the Latin; nor does it well suit the career of Caesar or the prospects of Gallus in 45 B.C.. But the decisive argument is that it makes little sense for Gallus to say that he will read in the historians that the temples of Rome have been enriched with Caesar's spoils. He could see that by walking down the street.

The error lies in *post tuum reditum*. Gallus is not seeing Caesar off on a campaign. They are both abroad. This is their parting. Gallus is staying abroad. Caesar is returning to Rome (*post tuum reditum*). The scene is Egypt, the date is 30 B.C., and the Caesar is Octavian, who has defeated Antony and Cleopatra and is leaving to take over the rule of the Roman world (*maxima Romanae pars eris historiae*). Gallus has been asked to undertake the prefecture of Egypt, and this entails sacrifices, but he sees his duty, and this fate will be sweet to him when he reads (in letters from Rome, perhaps from his friend Caesar) that Caesar's trophies have been dedicated in the temples of the city.

Against this date might be argued the mention in line 1 of Lycoris, who was active in the 40s (see *JRS* 69[1979], 155): *tristia nequit[ia]la Lycori tua.*

But the layout of the page (1 line + 4 + 4 + 4 + indicates that lines 2-5 form a separate poem (see Parsons, *JRS* 69[1979], 130). Nevertheless Nisbet (*JRS* 69[1979], 149) argues that these elegiac epigrams seem to have been composed as a sequence, his main evidence being the 'antithesis' between *tristia* (line 1) and *dulcia* (line 2), and the 'persistent antithesis between the first and second persons'. Even if the epigrams do form a sequence (and I am not convinced by such 'thematic connexions'), there would still be no reason to believe that these poems referred to the same period in Gallus' life. Older men do on occasions look back on the poetry and the mistresses of their youth. 'My fate, Caesar, will be sweet to me when the time comes that you will be the greatest part of Roman history' is a comprehensible statement fully explained by what follows (A.J.Woodman refers me to the 'solitude' *topos* in *propemptika* as discussed by Francis Cairns in *Generic composition*, p. 133 n.9). There is no need to posit a logical link with a separate previous poem of which we understand very little.

Surely what we have in lines 2-5 is an effective, free-standing epigram, one of a collection, written by a man who was one of the greatest poets of his day, *praefectus fabrum* to a Caesar who was the most powerful Roman of the day, like, and unlike, the epigrams of Catullus touching Mamurra. It was written when the friends were parting after the campaign which had settled the Civil War. No contemporary who read this poem would have been puzzled for a moment. They knew who Caesar

was, and where he was leaving Gallus, and where he was returning to.

In 26 B.C. history played a trick with the first seven words of this epigram. Augustus had become part of Roman history. He had adorned the temples with his trophies. Letters did arrive from Rome, but Gallus did not find that his fate was sweet.

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D.M.BAIN(Manchester): *Semonides* 7.75 - the locomotion of the ape-woman LCM 8.6(Jun.1983), 93-94

Semonides describes the ape-woman thus:

τοῦτο δὴ διακριδὼν
 Ζεὺς ἀνδράσιν μέγιστον ὤπασεν κακόν.
 αἰσχίστα μὲν πρόσωπα· τοιαύτη γυνή
 εἴσιν δι' ἄστεος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γέλωσ·
 ἐπ' αὐχένα βραχεῖα· κινεῖται μόγις· 75
 ἀπυγος, αὐτόκωλος. ἃ τέλος ἀνὴρ
 ὅστις κακὸν τοιοῦτον ἀγκαλίζεται.

Recently H.D.Jocelyn, arguing against the punctuation here adopted at the end of line 75 (West's - it is recommended by F.D.Harvey, *LCM* 8.2[Feb.1983], 32), has put forward a novel interpretation of the words κινεῖται μόγις (*LCM* 8.3[Mar.1983], 48). He suggests that the reference is not to the ape-woman's awkward movement upon the ground (as distinct from the agility of the ape at tree level)¹, but that the expression denotes her poor performance 'on the couch', *male crisat* rather than *aegre se mouet*, and adduces in support of this interpretation of κινεῖται some passages from Aristophanic comedy.

I am not convinced, and feel bound to proclaim my dissent (in part as a reaction to the present fashion² of making facetious statements about 'Manchester' in a way that suggests that there exists not merely 'single-mindedness' of purpose, but also unity of doctrine in that place). It is often very difficult to disprove a sexual interpretation of a given passage - since Greek has many seemingly innocent words which can assume a secondary, sexual meaning, the occasions offered for such interpretations are almost limitless - and I present here not so much an attempt at a formal refutation of Jocelyn's suggestion as the expression of a series of misgivings about it.

1). The context does not immediately suggest that sexual innuendo is in place or demanded. At first sight, at any rate, one would take κινεῖται μόγις as just one in a series of physical descriptions which go to justify the assertion³ that she goes 'through the town, a laughing-stock to everyone'. With Jocelyn's interpretation κινεῖται μόγις takes us out of the city streets and into the bedroom⁴. ἀπυγος, αὐτόκωλος are now to be taken closely with κινεῖται μόγις (Jocelyn, like others before him⁵, demands a comma preceding them). Instead of standing parallel to ἐπ' αὐχένα βραχεῖα they become two of three details which are meant to suggest the sexual unattractiveness of the ape-woman. Jocelyn, if I understand him aright, in his final paragraph seems to take all three together as indications that the woman will be an inadequate performer in bed.

2). It is hard to see, however, why the lack of a well-upholstered πωγή (for this characteristic in apes note Aristotle, *HA* 2.8.502b καὶ οὐτ' ὅσχια ἔχει ὡς τετράπουν ὄν ...) would justify κινεῖται μόγις if we are meant to take what follows those words as a kind of gloss or amplification of them. Jocelyn writes of a lack of flesh which would prevent the woman making movements 'in a manner *pleasing* [my italics] to her partner', but the text says nothing about *pleasing* movement; it speaks only of difficulty.

3). κινεῖται μόγις makes excellent sense applied, in its non-sexual meaning, both to the woman and to the creature to whom she is akin. She moves like an ape and is therefore a laughing-stock to those who see her. Apes on the ground, although in fact highly effective movers (cf. A.H. Schultz, *The Life of the primates*, 51ff.), are, compared with humans and judging by human standards of what is decorous, not exactly elegant in their locomotion: they certainly do not move in a manner which the Greeks would find desirable or decorous in a woman. If, however, we take κινεῖται as *crisat*, all analogy with simian behaviour vanishes: *crisatio* is a possible ingredient of human copulation ('female mammals are generally quiescent during copulation', *Oxford Companion to Animal Behaviour* 106: anthropoid apes in fact show a remarkable range of sexual postures, but it seems doubtful whether Semonides and his audience would know this). There are, it must be admitted, places in this poem where what is said of an animal-woman could not be said *au pied de la lettre* of her animal congener (e.g. ἀν' ὄϊκον 3, ἐν εἰμασιν 5 - both of the pig-woman - εἶπεν ... 46-47, 58-64, 90f.), but these are natural extensions of the basic theme. The pig is dirty (a traditional

1. Verdenius, *Mnem.* 1978, 75, rejects Lloyd-Jones' explanation, and follows Marg in taking ἐπ' αὐχένα closely with κινεῖται. It is hard to see why the shortness of her neck should hinder the woman's locomotion.
2. uide, e.g. 'This England' ap. *The New Statesman*, Jan 7th 1983, p.7. [The Editor is not guiltless in this matter, e.g. *LCM* 6.2(Feb.1981), 36; 7.1(Jan.1982), 1; and indeed 8.2(Feb.1982), 32]
3. Verdenius refers to K.G.II 344.
4. It is true that by ἃ τέλος ἀνὴρ | ὅστις κακὸν τοιοῦτον ἀγκαλίζεται (76-77) we have definitely reached the bedroom, but I do not see that this determines how we take κινεῖται.
5. See Verdenius.

94 and unjustified calumny): therefore the pig-woman will be a sluttish house-keeper, etc.. I know of no Greek lore which makes out that the female ape is an incompetent sexual partner.

4. It is doubtful whether κινεῖσθαι⁶ is ever used as Jocelyn wants it to be used here. κινεῖν and its derivatives are, as is well known, used interchangeably with (and with no recognizable semantic difference from) the direct, offensive and comprehensive word for intercourse, βινεῖν and its cognates. The following examples make this clear:

- a) κινητήριον 'knocking shop', Eupolis, *Demoi* fr.92.27 Austin, a place where someone κινεῖ or βινεῖ someone else.
- b) κινητιῶν 'crave intercourse', Menander, *Dysk.* 462, used there (slave girls are the subject) exactly as βινητιῶν with the 'passive' partner as subject: the two verbs are alternatives in the two versions of Aesop's life (G *Vit. Aesop.* 32 & *Vit. Aesop.* W 15⁷).
- c) Κινησίας, the name of the sex-starved husband of Myrrhine in Aristophanes *Lys.* 852 et al., chosen because he wants βινεῖν (*Lys.* 934) and because Kinesias is an authentic Athenian name.
- d) The possible MG dialect survival κίνημα 'Schandtat' (see Andreotis, *Lexicon der Archaismen in neogriechischen Dialekten*, Wien 1974) ~ βίνημα (found in a graffito from Stabia - see P.d'Orsi, *IP* 23[1968], 228ff., & Gallavotti, *MCR* 13-14[1978-79], 363ff.).

For κινεῖσθαι = *crisare* Jocelyn can only adduce προκινεῖσθαι⁸ (note that this verb is also to be found with the active partner as subject at Xenarkhos fr.4.22). He argues that ὁ κινούμενος (Aristophanes *Clouds* 1102) is analogous, = *ceuentes*, but the people referred to there and in Aristophanes *Knights* 877 and 879 (where βιν- forms are variants)⁹ and in Eupolis fr.100.2 could as easily be the subject of passive verbs (so e.g. Dover, *Greek homosexuality*, 141). I conclude that κινεῖσθαι, unless prior indication that a sexual meaning was intended had been given, would suggest to the hearer not something incidental to the sexual act, but the act itself. In the context of Semonides 7.75 κινεῖται = βινεῖται would hardly do (as Jocelyn himself affirms).

5. Finally there is a chronological question. Even allowing that sexual κινεῖσθαι would suit the context we may doubt that such a usage existed in Semonides' time. Pre-Aristophanic instances of sexual κινεῖν are rare and uncertain:

- a) at Arkhilokhos fr.36 West πρὸς τοῖχον ἐκινήθησαν ἐν παλινωκίῳ (adduced by both Sternbach and Headlam-Knox) ἐκινήθησαν, even if sound (West prints Toup's ἐκλίνθησαν) need not be sexual: the context is too obscure for any conclusion about it to be reached
- b) *alesp. iami.* 37 παχυσκελὴς ἀλετρις πρὸς μύλην κινουμένη
μύλη Sternbach 'βιν- potes uel legere uel intellegere' West.

Date and provenance uncertain.

6. On the κινεῖν/βινεῖν problem see as well as Headlam-Knox on Herodas 5.22 (cited by Jocelyn) Nauck, *Mélange: gréco-romains* IV.660, Sternbach, *Meletemata Graeca Pars I.* 60ff. and *WStud.* 8(1886), 236f., van Leeuwen on Aristophanes *Clouds* 1102, Handley on Menander *Dysk.* 462f., Pascucci, *A&R* 4(1959), 102ff., and *Studi in onore di Vittorio di Falco* (Napoli 1977), 211f., and Baldwin, *AdP* 102(1981), 79f.. Of these the most significant contributions are those of Sternbach and Handley.
7. See G.P. Shipp, *Modern Greek evidence for the ancient Greek vocabulary*, p.149f..
8. The reference to Aristophanes *Pax* 255-6 should be corrected to Aristophanes *Pax* 902.
9. There is only one, reasonably, secure instance of the middle of βινεῖν, Aristophanes fr.377 κείσεσθον ὥστερ πηνίω βινουμένω (κινουμένω), where the subject denotes the male and female of a species and the middle is used just as the middle of ὀχεύειν - the commonest word for non-human intercourse - is used passim in Aristotle's zoological writings (cf. also Kyanides 2.14.10ff Kaimakes ἐάν δὲ ὀχευόμενος δύο ἀρσενόθηλυ ἀγρευσις: for the θῡανδα ἀρσενόθηλυ 'male and female' cf. P.Maas, *Kleine Schriften* 206).
10. This may not be an argument of great moment. We know now that Arkhilokhos made use of what had been regarded as a characteristically Athenian imprecation, ἐς κόρακας (fr.196 A 31 *Dieg* West).

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One of the recently discovered paederastic rupestral inscriptions from Thasos provides us with an *addendum lexiciis*: a boy named Aetes is described as ἀστεοπρόσωπος (see *BCH* 106[1982], 7 - the style of writing suggests apparently a date found about the middle or the third quarter of the 4th century B.C.). This new word finds a parallel in and throws some light upon a recently discovered Menandrian line. In Menander *Mis.* A 93 (see E.G. Turner, 'The lost beginning of Menander *Misoumenos*', *PBA* 63[1977], 314ff. and P. Oxy 3368-71, in particular p.12 of *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* XLVIII, p.12) Getas says of his master's appearance

ἀλ[λ]’ ὄψιν ὑπερόστειος.

Menander *Mis.* A 90ff. are very puzzling lines, and I do not claim to be able to explain them. The new graffito, however, does supply us with helpful evidence about the nuance of ὄψιν ὑπερόστειος (~ ἀστεοπρόσωπος): it certainly suggests that the only translation so far offered for 93, 'but your face, an aesthete's', is not particularly appropriate.

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Review: JOHN BOARDMAN (Lincoln College, Oxford)

LCM 8.6 (Jun. 1983), 95

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John Pinsent, *Greek mythology*, Hamlyn (London, New York, Sydney, Toronto) 1982, 2nd revised edition with a postscript and additional illustrations, in the *Library of the world's myths and legends*, pp. 144. Cloth, £6.95. ISBN 0 600 34278 6

For the general reader there can be no better introduction to Greek myth, its stories and their interpretation. The stories have been retold many times, as by Robert Graves, but his interpretations are highly idiosyncratic and often demonstrably wrong. Pinsent is far more eclectic, and this is surely the correct approach, since all those schemes which 'explain' Greek myth in terms of one basic approach - structuralist, ritualist, historical, etc. - founder in its infinite and chimeric variety, and where challenged by awkward facts take refuge in faith, which is no way to good scholarship. Pinsent depolys all the possibilities, each in its appropriate setting or episode - that the myths derive from attempts to explain ritual; that they reflect earlier social orders, matrilineal or the like; that they reflect earlier religious attitudes, the basic fertility motif; that they express the human subconscious in a Freudian manner; that they derive from history or the desire to create divine and mortal genealogies. That his application of a particular explanation in a particular case is always right is another matter. There will never be a consensus. But the reader is made aware of the possibilities, neatly argued, and this is what matters. If he is left a little bewildered by it all this is probably exactly the right impression he should have.

The stories are told in varying detail, always in lively prose and with no little humour. The balance is perhaps strange. There is more on the gods and some quite minor heroic episodes than on the best-known stories - as of Herakles - which the reader will be familiar with and for which he might look here for more detail and explanations. The layout is roughly 'historical', from Creation to the Return of the Heraklids. All are accompanied by excellent illustrations from Greek art with descriptive and chatty captions. These do, however, underline one of the problems which any such illustrated survey is bound to provoke. Greek myth in texts, on which these chapters are based, often looks very different from Greek myth in art. This is largely because much of the detail in our texts is late, while art offers versions of stories which may never have enjoyed formal record in literature, or which had been severely distorted in the interests of a poet's 'message'. Hermes may slay Argos with a stone in story, but in the pictures (p. 45) he uses a sword - a trivial example but one of many. The artists' interests, too, more probably reflect the knowledge and interest of the ordinary Greek than do the many minor episodes and personalities which are of local interest to towns or sanctuaries, but which fill the texts of later mythographers and so get retold today.

Another problem is the way in which Greek myth changed, the way in which stories could be drastically reshaped in the service of cult, family, history, or their functions as parable or as carriers of a moral message. Some examples of this process would have warned the reader against the easy assumption that there was 'a' story of X or Y, rather than a variety of stories, sometimes highly contradictory, and would have alerted him to this fascinating aspect of Greek myth, barely shared by other mythologies, and the bane and undoing of those who seek to compare Greek myth closely with other mythologies. Not giving due weight to this problem, Pinsent is able to suggest (p. 92) that Herakles' Amazon labour is a convenient way to get him to Troy, and probably borrowed from Theseus. In fact we have an interesting sequence of Herakles' great expedition against the Amazons becoming refined down, in the 5th century, to a single episode with Hippolyte, and, en route, giving the lead to stories of Theseus and Amazons. That Theseus' own dealings with Amazons, including his repulse of them from Attica, is part of the 'anti-climax' of his career (p. 110) is hardly what any post-Persian War Athenian would have thought.

Inevitably, there are many points of this sort in text, and more often in caption, where minor adjustments and improvements are possible, and might be considered for the third edition which this volume (first published in 1969; this is a new version) will certainly deserve.

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G.B.A. FLETCHER (Newcastle-upon-Tyne): *On some passages in Tacitus, Histories 5*

LCM 8.6 (Jun. 1983), 95-96

Heubner's recent commentary invites a few additions and corrections.

- 1.1 *promptum ... in armis*. H. quotes Nepos, *Them.* 1.4 *in rebus gerendis promptus*. Cf. Valerius Maximus 3.3. ext. 2 *in ... excitandis ad uigorem iuuenum animis promptissimus*; Suetonius, *Tit.* 3.2 *uel in orando uel in fingendis poematibus promptus*.
- 2.1 *fanosae*. H. says that the meaning '*ist silberne Latinität*'. See *Annotations on Tacitus*, p. 57
- 2.3 *propiora Syriae*. H. has *propiora Syriae*, and quotes Curtius 7.7.4 as *quae septentrioni propiora sunt*. Cf. Virgil *A.* 5.168 *propiora tenentem*.
- 3.1 *uastis locis*. H. cites a passage of Sallust and one of Mela. Cf. Cicero, *Part.* 36; Sallust, *Jug.* 78.5.
 cuius auxilio praesentes miseras pepulissent. H. remarks that *pepulissent* is '*gehoben für depulissent*'. Cf. Plautus, *Most.* 716 *quo dolo a me dolorem procul pellerem*; Celsus 2.14.5 *potest ... morbus ... adhibito auxilio pelli*; Pliny *NH* 20.18 *frigus pellit e pedibus*, 20.38 *radicis ... decoctae sucus taenias pellit*, 21.93 *ad pellendos morbos*.
- 3.2 *grex asinorum agrestium*. W. Heraeus quotes Varro *RR* 2.1.5 *asini feri*, Pliny *NH* 8.108 *asinorum siluestrium* and Ammianus Marcellinus 23.4.7 *asini feri*. H. repeats the quotation from Pliny, and says that the expression *asinorum agrestium* occurs nowhere else. Cf. Ammianus 24.8.5 *asinorum ... greges agrestium*.

- 96 4.1 *quo sibi gentem firmaret*. Cf. Livy 21.5.5 *animis in se firmatis*.
 5.2 *proiectissima ad libidinem gens*. H. quotes Justinus 41.3.9 *in libidinem proiecti*. Cf. Seneca Dial. 10.7.1 *in ... libidinem projectorum*; Cicero Verr. 2.1.2 *ad audendum proiectus*.
 6.1 *terra finesque qua ad Orientem uergunt Arabia terminantur*. H. quotes Curtius 6.6.23 *rupes ... qua uergit ad orientem*. Cf. Augustus Anc. 5.32 *provincias omnis quae trans Hadrianum mare uergunt ad Orientem*; Lucan 9.420-421 *Libycae quod fertile terrae est | uergit in occasus*; Pliny NH 3.147 *ad septentriones Pannonia uergit, finitur inde Danubio*; Seneca Dial. 4.15.5 *in ... septentrionem ... uergentibus*.
 9.1 *in dicionem ... cesserant*. H. quotes Justinus 33.2.7 *in dicionem Romanorum cessisset*. Cf. Sallust Cat. 20.7 *in ... dicionem concessit*; Livy 29.29.10, 31.8, 30.7.2, 38.16.9.
 10.2 *curae rediere*. H. quotes Silius 1.652. Cf. Statius Theb. 8.606.
 11.1 *longius ausuri*. H., like W. Hearaeus, quotes Propertius 4.6.45 *nimum remis audent prope* and *Itinerarium Alexandri* p. 14.1 Volkmann *ultra audere*, and with little relevance adds Virgil A. 9.690 *procurrere longius audent*. Cf. Statius Theb. 11.258-9 *ille autem fractis huc audeat usque | uiribus*.
 11.1 *extrema rupis abrupta*. H. quotes Seneca Tro. 1084 *extrema montis ... praerupti*. Cf. Sallust Jug. 37.4 *praerupti montis extremo*.
 12.1 *ambibatur*. For the passive H. quotes Lucan and the elder and the younger Pliny. Cf. Velleius 1.11.3.
 12.4 *per speciem sacrificandi*. H. quotes Livy 44.37.12 *per speciem immolandi*. Cf. Livy 24.12.4 *per speciem sacrificandi*, 9.30.8, 33.14.2, 39.35.4, 42.52.8.
propinquantibus Romanis bellum externum concordiam pararet. Cf. Livy 2.39.7 *externus timor maximum concordiae uinculum*.
 13.2 *sibi tantum fatorum magnitudinem interpretati*. H. says that there is no earlier example of *interpretari* with a dative. Cf. Livy 3.20.5 *nec interpretando sibi quisque ius iurandum et leges aptas faciebat*.
 15.2 *prosperis feroces*. Cf. Sallust Jug. 94.4 *secundis rebus feroces*; Livy 3.61.13 *feroces ab re ... bene gesta*.
 16.1 *postera luce*. Andresen on Ann. 16.27.1 says that this expression is a novelty, and H. here cites Suetonius Aug. 94.6 *postera luce* and *Ciris* 349 *postera lux*. Cf. Pliny NH 36.97 *postera luce* and Ammianus Marcellinus 21.13.8 *luce postera* and Horace Sat. 1.5.39 *postera lux*.
 24.1 *neque adhorret uero*. Cf. Suetonius Tib. 62.3 *nec abhorret a uero*.

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T.E. KINSEY (Glasgow): Virgil, Aeneid 6.392-4 yet again

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I comment briefly on the three sections of D.P. Fowler's article in LCM 8.4 (May 1983), 77-78.
 a) There is no dispute about *nec ... sum laetatus* being a strong litotes, and Fowler is right in maintaining that logic does not preclude Charon from meaning 'although they were living men' in 394.

b) Even if it be admitted that life is a condition for the application of the description *invicti viribus*, it would appear to be only a necessary, not a sufficient one, and this would be a roundabout way of saying *vivi*. There is no need to labour this point, since the other phrase, *dis genti*, does not imply *vivi*, and if Charon intended 394 to mean 'although they were living men', then the first half is irrelevant and the second obscure.

c) i. 'If we understand 394 as giving an excuse to Charon, then we must refer *nec ... sum laetatus* primarily to his subsequent punishment. 395-8, however, are most naturally taken as explaining *nec ... sum laetatus*; he transported them and got no joy of it - just look at what they did! The punishment of Charon may be alluded to but the primary reason for his discomfiture lies in the very actions of Hercules, Theseus and Pirithous. Excuses are irrelevant to this'. I do not see that the source of Charon's discomfiture, whether prison or conscience, makes much difference to the logic: 'I suffered' (mentally or physically) for what I'd done, even though I had a good excuse'. However an allusion to Charon's punishment gives him a stronger argument; 'I got prison for it' rather than 'I felt bad about it'.

ii. 'We can of course deduce from 395-8 that these actions were so terrible that Charon must have been punished for them but this requires a further logical leap'. Virgil's learned reader does not need to deduce since he knows with Servius that Charon was punished. What he has to decide is whether *nec ... sum laetatus* alludes to the pains of prison or to the harrowed feelings of an infernal dog-lover (395-6).

iii. '392-7 are ... three examples of the operation of the law mentioned in 391'. In fact they tell us Charon suffered because of two breaches of the law.

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'Is this a free fight or can anyone join in'. The Editor wishes that some other learned Virgilian might arbitrate in this clash of Titans. To his untutored mind the thought seems to run as follows: 'You are armed and alive, so I cannot take you. I got no joy of previous cases (also armed) and they were of divine descent (as you are not [Aeneas' divine descent is not mentioned at 403-4, only his *pietas*]). The Sibyl reassures Charon that Aeneas contemplates no such actions, gives his motive of *pietas*, and shows his passport. He thinks this puts him with Fowler, abandoning editorial impartiality, but the grammatical point he leaves to others.'